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Introduction
The French philosopher Gilbert Simondon was the first true philosopher of
information, yet few outside of France know anything about him, let alone details
of the informational ontology that he would construct. Born in Saint-Etienne on
October 2, 1924, Simondon died suddenly in Palaiseau on February 7, 1989.
According to a biography on the website organized in honor of her late father’s
work, Nathalie Simondon writes that in his last years Simondon suffered from a
“psychological distress” which caused him to prematurely end his career in the
early 1980s. 1 More than anything else, this brief biography, written by the
daughter of one of France’s greatest yet least well-known modern philosophers,
conveys a feeling of tragic contingency, loss, and the notion that, hidden deep
beneath the surface of piles of manuscripts and notes that he left behind,
Simondon may yet have left us a few philosophical diamonds still waiting to be
discovered. 2 The situation is even more unfortunate in that most of what
Simondon did allow to be published has, as of this writing, yet to be translated
into English. 3 Almost half a century ago now, Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995)
discovered what we are beginning to know today. Simondon is responsible for
articulating “an entirely new philosophy.”4 What Deleuze did not point out, and
what many English readers of Simondon have heretofore failed to pick up on, is
that in articulating this new philosophy Simondon was simultaneously engaged in
conversation with some of the most technically advanced scientists, engineers,
and mathematicians of the twentieth century. Any real understanding of
Simondon’s approach to individuation – most central of all Simondonian concepts
– must acknowledge the privileged position that Simondon gave to notions from
within engineering, physics, and especially cybernetics in his original ontology
which, as this paper will show, remains a deeply informational one.
So far, in France there have been two areas of research on Simondon; the first
are works dedicated to the more political dimensions of his philosophy and the
1

See Nathalie Simondon’s biography of her father at http://gilbert.simondon.fr/Bio/. The
first part of this essay draws heavily from this online biography. Further references to it
will be footnoted “Nathalie.” All translations of this and any work by Gilbert Simondon
are my own.
2
One of the stated purposes of the site is to organize the publication of posthumous
material.
3
There is one book, however it consists of material for some university courses he taught
and does not cover any of the more significant work on communication and information.
Gilbert Simondon, Two Lessons on Animal and Man, (Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing,
2012).
4
Gilles Deleuze, “On Gilbert Simondon,” Desert Islands: and Other Texts, 1953-1974,
(New York: Semiotext(e), 2004).
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second include those that, rightfully, attempt to situate him within the history of
metaphysics, and specifically the concept of individuation.5 What we have not
seen, however, is an attempt to come to terms with the more technical nature of
Simondon’s engagement with the sciences. Simondon was incredibly well-versed
in fields that lay beyond the ken of most practicing philosophers. In a brief
interview he conducted with the French magazine Esprit late in his life, he spoke
about his philosophical approach, yet the interview is peppered with references to
a diverse array of scientists, engineers, and inventors, including Albert Ducrocq,
James Clerk Maxwell, Allen B. DuMont, Robert Stephenson, Michael Faraday,
and others.6 It is a curious fact that we have yet to see anyone outside of France
mention this area of Simondon’s work, just as we have yet to see a comprehensive
account of Simondon’s engagement with cybernetics, perhaps the most important
and least addressed aspect of his philosophy. A reading of Simondon must take
into account his engagement with these fields, and appreciating his unique
conception of the notion of information is essential for any understanding of
individuation and the new branch of ontology that he helped to introduce. Indeed,
Simondon’s name fits just as comfortably among names like Claude Shannon
(1916–2001), Warren Weaver (1894–1978), and Norbert Wiener (1894–1964),
just as it does Deleuze, Lyotard, and Latour.
The following essay corrects something of this shortcoming by, first, situating
Simondon in relation to the cyberneticist concept of information, broadly
understood, and second, by analyzing the informational ontology that he helped to
introduce. What I hope will become clear is the extent to which Simondon
articulated a robust philosophy of information, one that resonates with
contemporary approaches to this field, particularly by a new breed of philosophers
who have made it their task to develop comprehensive philosophies of
information and computation, such as Brian Cantwell Smith and Luciano Floridi.7
The essay is divided into four sections. In the first section, I provide a
biographical account of Simondon’s philosophical maturation in order to better
situate him within the broader context of the French intellectual scene of postWorld War II Europe. In the second section, I draw on work from some of the
5

Muriel Combes, Gilbert Simondon and the Philosophy of the Transindividual,
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012). Pascal Chabot, La philosophie de Simondon, (Paris:
Librairie Philosophique Vrin, 2003). The former is an exegesis of Simondon’s politics,
while the latter was the first attempt at situating him within the history of metaphysics.
6
Simondon. “Sauver l'objet technique. Entretien avec Gibert Simondon.” Esprit 76, no. 4
(1983): 147-52.
7
Brian Cantwell Smith. On the Origin of Objects, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
Luciano Floridi, The Philosophy of Information, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011).
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American cyberneticists and related thinkers that Simondon heavily engaged, with
the primary aim of dispelling the outmoded argument, brought up by some
contemporary philosophers, that somehow Simondon remained diametrically
opposed to the mathematical theory of communication. On the contrary, the
American cyberneticists acknowledged right from the beginning what were the
shortcomings of the engineering version of information, and Simondon picked up
on these threads before setting out on his own philosophical approach. In the third
section, I offer an exegesis of his informational ontology, along with my own
comments on the philosophy of information. Lastly, I explain how Simondon’s
unique contributions can be used to transform work in the field of
communication. However, before unpacking Simondon’s informational ontology,
it will be helpful to understand a little more about his background and the wellheeled education that he received both in France and abroad that led him to a deep
and prolonged engagement with what would become one of the twentieth
century’s most talked about phenomena.
Situating Simondon
The philosopher is described by his daughter as having been always on the
lookout for new opportunities for recording and reflection. He apparently kept
notebooks and a large sketch book during all traveling events, whether at
conferences, family holidays or simply journeying abroad.8 These notebooks were
for sketching architecture and design material he would use in his academic
teaching. He conducted experiments in the family home that would also find the
fruits of their labor winding up as demonstrative lessons in the academy. But he
was no shuttered academic; once in Paris he surrounded himself with the likes of
such influential thinkers as Martial Guéroult, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean
Hyppolite, Jean-Toussaint Desanti, Gusdorf Georges, Jean Laporte, Jean Wahl,
and Jacques Lacan. He studied with Gaston Bachelard, specifically on polarity in
psychology up to 1948, and seems to have maintained a life-long correspondence
with him. 9 Taking a graduate degree studying the Presocratics, Simondon also
seems to have maintained an early interest in ancient philosophy, one that would
remain as he situated his informational ontology in opposition to Aristotle’s
hylomorphism. 10 Yet his interests remained far reaching. He was equally
interested in physics (he had a certificate in mineralogy), and also psychology (he
8

Nathalie.
Ibid.
10
For a more comprehensive analysis of Simondon’s relation to both Aristotle and
Deleuze in terms of hylomorphism, see my “A New Individuation: Deleuze’s Simondon
Connection.”
9
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had a psychophysiology certificate, under the direction of Alfred Fessard), as well
as zoology, mathematics, and the arts. He passed the agrégation de philosophie in
1948 and was appointed to the Descartes School in Tours, where he taught from
1948 to 1955. 11 In 1952, he studied for three months at the University of
Minnesota, learning social psychology, and he participated in a seminar in
experimental psychology with Paul Fraisse. The context in which Simondon
produced his most important philosophical works is equally impressive. His main
thesis, L'individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d'information
(Individuation in the Light of the Notions of Form and Information), directed by
Jean Hyppolite, was finally defended in 1958, “before a jury of Jean Hyppolite,
Raymond Aron, Georges Canguilhem, Paul Ricoeur and Paul Fraisse, and was
also attended by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean Wahl, Pierre-Maxime Schuhl and
Mikel Dufrenne.”12 His minor thesis (the French system required that candidates
produce two theses), Du mode d'existence des objets techniques (On the Mode of
Existence of Technical Objects), also defended in 1958, was directed under
Georges Canguilhem. Both have yet to be published in English.
Simondon was appointed Professor at the Sorbonne in 1963, and Professor
and Chair of Psychology in 1965, where he became a colleague of Juliette FavezBoutonnier.13 He also spent time at the University of Paris V, where he taught
general psychology, and founded the Laboratory of General Psychology and
Technology from 1963 to 1983. 14 He taught at the École Normale Supérieure,
specifically at ENS Ulm Street, St. Cloud and Fontenay from 1968 to 1969, and
he taught a course in social psychology and industrial psychology at the Faculty
of Humanities of Lyon, as well as a course on the psychology of art at the
Pedagogical Institute of Lyon from 1961 to 1963.15 He also worked and taught in
Saint-Etienne (1961/1962), Nice (1969), and Lille (1970). From 1964 to 1970 he
participated in a seminar on the history of science and technology led by Georges
Canguilhem. 16 Finally, and perhaps most importantly from a world-historical
perspective, he actively participated in the organization of the Sixth Symposium
at Royaumont on the concept of information in contemporary science, which
Norbert Wiener attended, in 1962.17 This conference would have a long-lasting
and far-reaching effect on the French intellectual scene, as it was the first
significant contact between American information scientists and their European
11

Nathalie.
Ibid.
13
Nathalie.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
12
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philosophical counterparts. The effects of this encounter would go through
Simondon and eventually find their way to Deleuze, who then disseminated many
cybernetic concepts in fields such as philosophy, literature, and the arts. It cannot
be underestimated how much French philosophy owes to Simondon’s early
encounter with cybernetics. Therefore, in the next section, I offer a short survey of
the cyberneticist position, before diving into the radically new informational
ontology that Simondon would derive from it.
Cybernetics
The American cyberneticists knew that there were areas yet unexplored by the
concept of information as it was expressed in mathematics and engineering.
Simondon knew this, and his approach to information was, in a way, an extension
of these concerns. While he remained deeply critical of some of the cyberneticist
approaches to information, he did not disagree with the engineering notion of
information altogether. The mathematical theory of communication (MTC)
continues to undergird all other forms of communication, including Simondon’s
notion of information. What I argue is that Simondon’s approach to informational
ontology is a type of extension of the mathematical theory of commutation, one
that accounts for the indeterminacy of information’s interactive existence and that
furthered the concerns of the earlier cyberneticists. Where the MTC notion of
information is associated with a closed system of positive and negative types of
feedback (the transmission model), Simondon approached information from a
perspective that allowed for the interoperability of different types of information,
leaving space for indeterminacy that would remain a fundamental component of
Simondon’s open informational schema. These two factors – interoperability and
indeterminacy – would allow him to apply the notion of information to fields
beyond mathematics and engineering. But what does the mathematical theory of
communication mean, and how did it set the groundwork for Simondon’s
informational ontology?
The idea that MTC undergirds other modes of information and
communication techniques makes sense given the utility of its wartime origins.
Developed in the Bell Labs in New York City during the Second World War, its
inventor, Claude Shannon (1916–2001), was a brilliant young thinker who spent
the better part of his academic life at MIT. His Master’s thesis on Boolean algebra
and what he called a “logic machine” would lay the foundations for the design of
computer circuits. One of Shannon’s often quoted passages is the following taken
from his landmark paper, “The Mathematical Theory of Communication,”
published in 1948 in the Bell System Technical Journal:
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The fundamental problem of communication is that
of reproducing at one point either exactly or
approximately a message selected at another point.
Frequently the messages have meaning; that is they
refer to or are correlated according to some system
with certain physical or conceptual entities. These
semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to
the engineering problem. The significant aspect is
that the actual message is one selected from a set of
possible messages. The system must be designed to
operate for each possible selection, not just the one
which will actually be chosen since this is unknown
at the time of design.18
This distinction between what we can call “data” and “semantic information”
would be explicated by other cyberneticists and related thinkers, including
Weaver, Wiener, Charles E. Osgood (1916–1991), and Wilbur Schramm (1907–
1987), each of whom believed that communication is, first and foremost, the flow
of information.19 Clearly, the idea here is that the MTC approach does not have
much to do with semantic information. Osgood and Wiener were equally as vocal
about MTC’s inability to account for semantic information. The idea was not that
MTC has nothing to do with semantics but rather that, while it might undergird
semantics, it cannot account for it on its own. The absence of this important
distinction acknowledged by cyberneticists is unfortunately reproduced in general
discussions that feed the popular imagination of what information theory and
cybernetics is all about, a practice that has been maintained with the appearance
of documentaries like Adam Curtis’ All Watched Over by Machines of Loving
Grace, a film that situates 1940s cybernetics, Thatcherism, and the Twentieth
century’s general dissolution of the rights of living beings as part of one confused
causal mess. While the film is admirable for the amount of information it shares
about early communication theorists, the realities that it speaks to are a touch
more subtle then what the 180 minute documentary is able to convey. A number
of cybernetic texts can speak to the open place left within information theory that
would later be taken up by Simondon.
Osgood – an American psychologist close to the cybernetic circle who is most
famous for developing the connotative meaning of concepts known as the
“semantic differential” – acknowledged that there was a field beyond the strictly
18

Claude Shannon, “The Mathematical Theory of Communication,” (Bell System
Technical Journal, vol 27, 1948).
19
While only some of these thinkers used the “cybernetic” label, all of them examined
cybernetic ideas and interacted with many of the field’s key thinkers.
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data-theoretic terms developed in the area of mathematics such as “sending” and
“receiving,” particularly in his description of “choice-parts,” that moment where
the information-theoretic content of a message gives way to something not
entirely predictable. This would be a theme throughout Osgood’s career, and it
shares much in common with Simondon’s approach. Osgood saw communication
sequences as informational in the MTC sense, but also as something that brings
the communicator repeatedly to what may be called
“choice-points”—points where the next skill
sequence is not highly predictable from the
objective communicative product itself. The
dependence of “I'd better not wash the car” upon
“looks like rain today,” the content, of the message,
reflects determinants within the semantic system
which effectively “load” the transitional
probabilities at these choice-points.20
Osgood would go on to describe a theory that lay beyond the “predicative” model,
however, this remained strongly tied to the transmission model of communication.
Like the other theorists of cybernetics, he theorized the way a semantic notion of
information might be predicated on a strictly engineering perspective of
communication, yet he reserved space for a non-connective realm. This sensitivity
to contingency, lack of probability, and openness to the informational
multimodality inherent to communicative processes are traits that Simondon felt
were equally important. Indeed, he would take it one step further by introducing
these features – which were up to then associated with semantic information only
– to information in the “hard” sense, that is to say, information as an entity. To put
it in terms of a helpful distinction made by Floridi, information can exist in three
ways: information “as” reality, information “for” reality, and information “about”
reality.21 Where the cyberneticists thought the interoperability and indeterminacy
of information “about” and “for” reality, Simondon thought these concepts in
terms of information “as” reality. Wiener, long unanimously declared the inventor
of the cybernetic tradition, knew this more than anyone.
Wiener saw communication as information just as Shannon did, yet where
Shannon stated that he attempted to explain only an engineering approach to
information and communication theory in his seminal paper of 1948, Wiener, like
20

Charles Osgood, “The Nature and Measurement of Meaning,” (Psychological
Bulletin, vol. 49. No. 3. May 1952).
Luciano Floridi, Information: A Very Short introduction, (London: Oxford University
Press, 2011). 65.

21
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Osgood and Simondon, admittedly sought to find the way that MTC information
can lay the groundwork for a much more fluid and diverse conception of
communication that develops from these connective underpinnings. The most
interesting figure among the group (for reasons that I will not go into here),
Wiener – who Bertrand Russell had once taught and described as thinking
“himself God Almighty,” complaining that “there is a perpetual contest between
him and me as to which is to do the teaching”22 – admitted that
The desire to apply Cybernetics of semantics, as a
discipline to control the loss of meaning from
language, has already resulted in certain problems.
It seems necessary to make some sort of distinction
between information taken brutally and bluntly, and
that sort of information on which we as human
beings can act effectively or, mutatis mutandis, on
which the machine can act effectively. In my
opinion, the central distinction and difficulty here
arises from the fact that it is not the quantity of
information sent that is important for action, but
rather the quantity of information which can
penetrate into a communication and storage
apparatus sufficiently to serve as the trigger for
action.23
Wiener developed an approach slightly different from that of MTC, one that
admitted to a world where semantic information remained different from, yet still
tied to, traditional notions of communication, where the data sent mattered less
than the type of data that could penetrate into different communication systems.
Different types of information mattered to the cyberneticists, as any careful
reading of their work will show, and this little acknowledged fact flies in the face
of contemporary, dehumanizing critiques of that tradition. Notice that penetration
is not the same thing as transmission and implies the overcoming of some
fundamental barrier. Contemporary debates on everything from cognitive science
to epistemology remain deeply tied to the distinction this barrier introduces in
terms of information, yet many, it would seem, are unable to account for the
interplay between what Wiener calls “brutal” or “blunt” information and the “sort
of information on which we as human beings can act effectively.” Contemporary
22

Flo Conway and Siegelman, Dark Hero of the Information Age: In Search of Norbert
Wiener the Father of Cybernetics, (New York: Basic Books, 2006).
23
Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950).
94.
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philosophers such as Floridi are attempting a systematic philosophy that might
define the interaction between these two levels of information and more. Indeed,
the philosophy of information as a field is long overdue. While the contemporary
approach to this field has begun by analyzing the texts of philosopher’s whose
work relied heavily on the notion of information – perhaps most importantly the
work of Fred Dretske (1932–2013)24 – Simondon remains a key figure that has
yet to receive substantial attention. The next section will outline some of the more
significant points in his philosophy of information, specifically Simondon’s
informational ontology.
Informational Ontology
A little bit of demystification is in order. Simondon’s informational ontology,
though exceedingly clear, has become obfuscated through individual
philosopher’s appropriative attempts at an explanation of his position.25 Deleuze
quizzically ignored many of the technical terms that Simondon inherited from the
American cybernetic tradition – one would be hard-pressed to find any sustained
engagement with concepts like “information” and “communication” in his work,
save for in one of his last texts, the deceivingly short, brilliant “Postscript on the
Societies of Control” – opting instead to retain only those terms in Simondon that
imbue a decidedly more philosophical feel, for example, as in such terms as the
“preindividual,” “ensemble,” and “dispartion.”26 Deleuze’s “rereading” (to put it
mildly) of other philosophers is well-known, and the case is no different with
Simondon. Simondon was no stranger to terms from fields outside of philosophy
proper, and he frequently made use of them, including terms like “transduction,”
“modulation,” and “information” (this last in an engineering sense). In what
follows, I will attempt to minimize my own reflections on what I call the more
“philosophical” terms associated with Simondon’s work and instead try to focus
on those that are directly linked with the different fields that Simondon was
drawing from. Additionally, most of the material that I will be quoting from in
this section comes from the second half of his major thesis, which was published
in France under the name L'individuation psychique et collective (Psychic and
Collective Individuation) by Aubier in 1989.

24

Fred Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981).
I do not think this is necessarily a bad thing in itself for the practice of philosophy.
However, if one wishes to better grasp the concepts Simondon was working with in terms
of their scientific significance there is a far more accurate and historically embedded
story to be told.
26
Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,” October, vol. 59 winter 1992.
25
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Simondon developed a unique approach to information that, while finding its
origins in the MTC notion of communication, left an open space in the
informational schema, allowing him to create a robust informational ontology.
Some of the important distinctions between Simondon and the MTC approach are
that, for the latter, information theory is one dimensional, is described in terms of
probability, and aligned with the notion of entropy as taken from
thermodynamics. In many ways, both are indebted to information’s spiritual
godfather John von Neumann (1903–1957) who, shortly before his death, had
prepared an unfinished manuscript for The Silliman Memorial Lectures Series at
Yale. This manuscript, erudite and speculative in nature, compared many
elements of the mathematical theory of communication (the computational model)
with the human mind (the biological model). The manuscript was published
posthumously under the title The Computer and the Brain in 1958 and the book’s
importance, along with von Neumann’s influence, cannot be underestimated.
Famously, the word “entropy” was suggested by von Neumann to Shannon to
name the value of information embedded in a message. Simondon knew about
these thermodynamic beginnings. In the MTC approach, he tells us, “information
theory is the starting point of a body of research that founded the concept of
negative entropy (or negentropy), showing that information corresponds to an
inverse process of degradation and that, within the entire pattern, information is
not definable in terms of the source, or the receiver, but from the relationship
between source and receiver.” 27 To understand how Simondon’s “alternative”
informational ontology built on these entropic beginnings to eventually move
away from MTC, there are a number of concepts that must be worked through, a
task that is doubly important before the rich material of Simondon’s courses and
conferences become available in English (they are infinitely more technical in
nature). 28 The most essential of these concepts are (1) metastability, (2)
individuation, (3) transduction, and (4) concretization. In what remains, I will
provide an exegesis of these terms.
Metastability signifies the first-order difference between Simondon’s notion
of information and the MTC version. Where the cyberneticists saw information as
a “thing” to be sent and received yet still reserved a place for semantics, they did
not account for the way that these different fields of information interact.
Simondon’s position is unique in that he viewed information as acting in a state of
metastability, within a dual-dimensional and preindividual system, one whose
nexus or pivoting point rested with the notions of information’s interoperability
and indeterminacy. Rather than stop at information in terms of its probabilistic
Gilbert Simondon, L'individuation psychique et collective, (Paris: Aubier, 2007). 50.
These are Cours sur la perception (1964–1965), Imagination et invention (1965–1966),
and Communication et Information: Cours et Conférences.
27

28
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transmissibility, he sought instead to think about the place where one type of
information interacts with another in an event that produces a fundamental change
in ontology. For example, he refers to information as being “never in a single
homogonous reality,” but instead as existing in “two ordered states of
disparation,” “disparation” here merely meaning the previous realms from which
the new informational “entity” emerges. Information “either at the unit [MTC] or
transindividual level is never deposited in a form that can be given,” […] but
instead is the communication “between two disparate realities,” a “meaning that
arises when an operation of individuation discovers that the two disparate yet real
dimensions may be a system of information.”29 Information passes from a state of
“metastability to stability;” it is “never a given thing” for Simondon. There is no
“unity and identity of information, because information is not an end; it requires a
system.” 30 The amount of foresight that Simondon shows in this formulation
borders on that of a clairvoyant. Before Marshal McLuhan, Simondon
acknowledged the fact that information itself, as “data” or “message,” was not the
whole story, and that the most important thing is the system where the
information is constituted. Yet one must be clear here; Simondon acknowledged
information’s multimodal character. Information could be “exchanged between
beings already individuated” but also “within systems to come that produce a new
individuation.”31 However, the bulk of Simondon’s work does focus on what one
could call “internal information”—“one could say that the information is always
internal, it should not be confused with information signals and media signals.”32
“The notion of form must be replaced by that of information” is quickly
becoming one of Simondon’s most well-known expressions.33 This brings us to
the second important notion to understand and probably the most talked about
term in Simondon’s philosophy—the notion of individuation. Individuation
indicates that there is a state of stability and metastability, and it implies “the
existence of a system in a state of equilibrium,” one that individuates entities;
information in this system is “the difference in shape,” again “never a single
term” but rather “the meaning that arises from a disparation.”34 Here, Simondon
argues that the notion of information “should never be reduced to signals,” as in
MTC, but that it must express the compatibility of two disparate realms.35 The
MTC realm sees information as a “homogeneous line in which information is
29

Gilbert Simondon, L'individuation psychique et collective, (Paris: Aubier, 2007). 22.
Ibid.
31
Ibid. 234.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid. 28.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid. 29.
30
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transmitted with maximum safety,” indicating a closed channel, one that advances
in signal strength as it avoids noise, and it is in this sense that “only content, not
code, can be transmitted.”36 Content is the only thing that can be transmitted in
the MTC model of communication; in the words of Shannon, it seeks to reproduce
“at one point either exactly or approximately a message selected at another point.”
For Simondon, informational ontology, on the contrary, must be understood not in
terms of informational content but in terms of informational code, understood as a
tool for converting informational artifacts into something entirely new.
Contemporary communication practices in “multimodality” and theories on
object-oriented ontology speak to something of this concept, and are beginning to
prove decisive in furthering our understanding of communicative processes. At
bottom it is about a technique which expresses the many different ways it is
possible to interface with an informational system. It is about a plurality of
individuation, and not a subjective or singular one. Had he lived long enough to
witness the flood of new approaches to information along with their attendant
technological advances – big data, computational ontology, cloud storage –
Simondon would have found solace in the fact that much of what he had to say on
the interoperability and indeterminacy of information’s ontological significance
came true. “Information is the formula of individuation” rings true today, finally
putting to rest philosophical speculations on the separation between matter and
form, subject and object. 37 The most astute observer of this has been Bruno
Latour, who describes Simondon as going beyond such simple distinctions,
indicating in his own playful manner that for Simondon “subject and object – far
from being at the beginning of reflection the two essential hooks to which it is
appropriate to attach a hammock so that the philosopher will be able to sleep – are
only rather late effects of the true story of the modes of existence.”38
If individuation is the concept that Simondon deploys in order to overcome
philosophy’s separation of matter and form – an ancient distinction that Simondon
traces back to Aristotle – seeking instead to describe information as existing in a
state of metastabilty, the name that Simondon gives to the actual action of
“changing” of informational properties is transduction. In this third cybernetic
term, form, for Simondon, “already draws on a theory of information.”39 What
becomes important to describe is instead the process by which different
informational properties interact among each other to produce something that is
ontologically new. Transduction indicates the meeting of two disparate
36
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informational realms and signals the beginning of the process of individuation. It
points to the emergence of a new informational structure, one that resolves a
disparity between fields, and these fields come together to actively produce the
“potential that lives in matter.”40 One of his favorite examples is the air-cooled
engine versus one that is water cooled. In the air-cooled engine, the informational
properties in the air perform multiple functions, whereas the water in the second
performs only one and acts as an addition. The air-cooled engine is open, in that
the schematic design of the engine interacts with another “milieu” (as Simondon
would put it). Transduction means that knowledge of the information inherent to
interoperable elements of an open structure can produce real ontological effects.
This example is admittedly more technological, but the priority of information
even in biology should become clear upon closer inspection. For now, it suffices
to say that transduction signifies domains of potentiality, these being the
connection of information inherent to different systems, in a way that interfaces
with other domains, unlocking and reconfiguring one another, once again calling
to attention the notion of the multimodality of communicative information. For a
more popular example, one merely has to think of apps and the way they
reconfigure information to produce new ontological realities, for instance, as
when GPS or other systems reproduce quantified aspects of reality in ways that
elicit new affective experiences on the part of the user.
There are, however, some philosophers who attempt to situate information as
being opposed to energetic notions of reality, as if thermodynamic properties
alone account for the materiality of the world. Nothing could be further from the
truth. In fact, information signifies an a priori philosophy, perhaps a first
philosophy, one that may work in tandem with energetics, as already evidenced
by the highly informational character of the work that is done by many
contemporary philosophers of science and physics.41 Floridi’s work is unmatched
in this regard, and his “method of levels of abstraction” shares many affinities
with Simondon’s philosophy of information. Like Floridi’s levels of abstraction,
Simondon sought not to treat information as idealism or as an “absolute
magnitude,” but instead materially, as “an exchange between parts of a system.”42
The Simondonian schema necessitates the conservation of information and posits
informational properties that, rather than acting as “bits” within a channel,
fundamentally alter the system itself, producing a new ontological reality by
reconfiguring two opposing realms in a way that resolves a contradiction.
40
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Simondon’s philosophy of information retains this sense of dialectic. The
relationship is not designed ideally as one “between preexisting terms, but as a
plan of reciprocal information exchange and causation in a system […] the
relationship exists physically.”43 It is both informational and material, producing
informational structural realism. Here, one sees what Deleuze may have found
most enticing in Simondon’s informational ontology. For Simondon, “information
expresses the immanence of each of the subsets with the set.”44 However, this
immanence does not imply homogeneity of information; information for
Simondon remains fundamentally heterogeneous: “Information is not
homogeneous with respect to its current structure, and there therefore remains in
the individual a margin between the current structure and acquired information.”45
Concretization describes the relationship of the metaphysics of information to
the ontology of the technical object. This is where I situate most of my own work
on Simondon. As is often the case with thinkers who deploy idiosyncratic use of
terminology, Simondon’s concepts are typically misread and grouped into a
combative category of thought to which I do not think they entirely belong. Many
have tried to situate Simondon as completely opposed to the mathematical theory
of communication to the extent that his theory bares absolutely no connection to
those of Shannon and Wiener. This would be a mistake. While Simondon was
often very critical of both Shannon and Wiener, I think it would be incorrect to
situate him as being diametrically opposed. Rather, I believe that Simondon
thought information as an entity in very much the same way as Shannon and
Wiener; however, he described the entity that information is in terms of a
different type of process. The difference is not that Simondon saw information as
a “thing” differently from Shannon and Wiener, but that he envisioned it’s
interoperability in a different sense. Like the buffoonish character Wayne in the
1992 movie Wayne’s World, if I continuously close and open one eye and then the
other (“Camera one, camera two! Camera one, camera two!”) it will produce each
time a new effect where my affective ocular sensibility changes with each “click”
(this back and forth of perspective is famously known as “parallax”). The objects
in my visual field clearly do not change when I perform this activity, but
something else certainly does, namely, the affect produced by each new percept.
But does this mean that these two pairings of affect/percept are two distinct
entities? Not at all. All that has changed is a mode of processing information. I
understand Simondon’s relationship to the mathematical theory of communication
in very much in the same way. Information is, of course, a real “thing” to be
discussed and studied; environmentally, semantically, and physiologically. It can
43
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even be viewed as being sent and received. The difference lies not in the “thing”
but in its process, its interoperability, and its functionality. This is where I see
Simondon contributing something that is unique to the philosophy of information
and communication. And I will admit my bias. In the aforementioned parallax
analogy, I view Simondon as having the one eye open.
So how does the interoperability of information lead us to artifacts, to
technological objects, and finally to theorizing technological genesis? I
understand technology in terms of technique. If opening and closing my eyes is a
technique, then it is a type of technology. But in this example there is no type of
long-form genesis. How to explain the long-form genesis of technical objects?
Here again Simondon proves eminently useful. His concept of concrétisation
(“concretization,” though this is an unfortunate translation), I believe, is more
useful than the concept of individuation in that it avoids humanist correlative
attitudes and certain types of “soft metaphysics” that people are prone to engage
in when dealing with highly generalizable, and historically messy, terms like
individuation. But I will not digress into a meta-theoretical exercise on why
occasionally the terminology associated with certain concepts deserves to be left
behind. Concrétisation is not quite like the English transitive verb
“concretization.” First of all, the English word is ugly. Second, and more
importantly, concrétisation is an indefinite process that does not indicate a
“transfer” as if something had gone from one state (abstract) to the next
(physical), as concretization does. Concretization defines a specific result. It is
used in the way that I can say, simplistically, that I have “given form to an idea”
(the way that a group of advertisers might be told to make a brand more
“concrete”). Concrétisation, on the other hand, describes a certain type of “pull;”
it indicates what Simondon described as the “life” or “being” of the technological
object. It is a notion popularized in books like Wired co-founder Kevin Kelly’s
What Technology Wants. But it is not a type of emergentism like the kind Kelly
argues for. The reason is that the “sum” of concrétisation is not greater than its
parts; it does not connote something that at one point never existed. To put it
simply, it’s concrétisation “all the way down.” Concrétisation is the engine that
drives individuation.
Even though I have just made the argument for the original French, for the
sake of clarity, in what remains I will simply say “concretization” since I am no
longer concerned with comparing the two, and the reader should understand
“concretization” in the French sense outlined above. So, what are the inherent
qualities of concretization? There are two. The first is that during the
technological genesis that is concretization, the technological object tends toward
self-sufficiency. You can cast aside all thoughts of “strong” artificial intelligence
and mythological notions of conscious machines. All this means is that
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concretization is not an additive process, and that the technological object tends to
get smaller as it re-purposes elements within itself. When I say that concretization
is not additive and that it becomes self-sufficient, this is due to Simondon’s
second and more nuanced point, that technological objects re-purpose themselves
by an interoperability that is achieved through the transduction of two regimes of
information. What does this mean? If I have a technical object “AB”, and I want it
to do something else, then I have to add “C” to it. This is not concretization but an
additive process (think of the water-cooled engine). Concretization operates more
along the lines of an algebraic equation, not in the direction of the “plugging in”
of numbers that happens when we substitute variable functions with known
quantities, but the reverse, when we reduce the equation down to its simplest,
abstract form. In this sense, concretization is a rather counter-intuitive process. It
does not tend toward the “real” or concrete “thing” so much as it does toward the
essence of the technical object. Simondon provides countless examples and
empirical evidence of just such a transcendental transductive principle throughout
Du mode d’existence des objets techniques, moments in history where parts in the
technological object become useful in more ways than one, re-purposed, or
achieve a higher state of interoperability, and as a result help to move the
technological object along in its concretization toward a more abstract state of
being. But it should not be forgotten, and people do not talk about this nearly
enough, that information plays a fundamental role in this concretization. If
concretization is the engine that drives individuation, then information is the gas
that keeps concretization working.
Informational ontology, then, sees all things as real, yet it acknowledges along
with Simondon that information is the methodological skeleton key that allows us
to inquire into the “objects” and “materiality” in the first place. As Floridi so
eloquently puts it, we are decades into our “fourth revolution” after Copernicus,
Darwin, and Freud. 46 At this late stage in the game, we need to keep this
philosophical car running and not turn back for lack of historical or philosophical
hindsight. Alan Turing, long held up by mathematicians and computer scientists,
deserves to enter the pantheon of continental heritage and create some ripples in
this too often isolationist pond. Simondon, while clearly at odds with much of the
mathematical theory of communication and its practitioners, did not denounce
them entirely. He engaged much of Turing, and the extent of Deleuze’s
engagement with Simondon was no tiny event, as we are all beginning to see. To
end with a cliché, it does not take a special type of genius to see that 1 + 2 = 3.

Luciano Floridi, The Fourth Revolution: How the Infosphere is Reshaping Human
Reality, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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For my conclusion, I will briefly explain what I believe a return to Simondon
– and specifically an informational ontology – can contribute to the field of
communication.
Communication and New Materialism
How might Simondon’s unique contributions be used to transform work in the
field of communication? What does it all mean? It would be much more effective
to explicate the significance of Simondon’s work and to describe exactly what
conceptual or methodological advantage there is in situating him as a philosopher
of information for communication. What is there to recommend his work?
The way I see it, Simondon is useful to the study of communication for four
reasons, although they can be grouped under the general observation that
communication as a discipline has yet to “find” a philosophy that it can call its
own. We have yet to find a work that outlines communication’s metatheoretical
positionality in toto. This is barring, of course, work on this subject in two bynow classic texts, Robert T. Craig’s excellent “Communication Theory as a Field”
(1999) and John Durham Peters’ insightful “Genealogical Notes on ‘The Field’”
(1993). Consider that many other “fields” have canonical philosophical texts that
outline something of their theoretical heritage. Communication must find a
philosophy that speaks to the multimodality of three things—information,
communication, and technology, and that answers the philosophical question
“What is communication?” I believe Simondon provides us with an answer to this
question, for it is not enough to accept the sorry conclusion, so often reached in
these metatheoretical exercises, that communication is an “interdisciplinary” mix
of this and that, or, worse, that it is by virtue of being an academic potpourri that
communication finds meaning. Such conclusions are conceptually lazy. Simondon
offers us the conceptual tools with which to parse through this field in a properly
analytical and philosophical way that can enable future scholars of
communication a way forward, while providing a useful reference point.
A return to Simondon specifically provides communication with the
following. First, Simondon offers us a new methodology from which to conduct
inquiries related to communication as an empirical endeavor. An individuative
methodology would seek to proceed by articulating instances of the modulation of
communicative processes themselves, rather than in the simple “transmission” of
meaning or data between pre-given, already individuated entities. For example,
whether we are talking about empirical evidence in doctor-patient health
communication or the analysis of vast quantities of data in social network
analysis, an individuative methodology would seek to measure, uncover or
understand those communicative structures that modulate in the act of
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communication and that perpetuate by virtue of an individuative flexibility. What
variable characteristics of the formal “consultation” setting are responsible for
trends that develop in interpersonal communication? How do reflective properties
inherent in the visibility of a wiki edit history potentially alter future edits? These
are the structural qualities of modulation that an individuative methodology would
seek to uncover. Second, Simondon offers us a new conceptual toolbox and
specialized terminology with which to frame our future discussions on entirely
new communicative phenomena: the language of technics. Instances of
modification in the technical evolution of objects such as engines, programs, and
games can be referred to as points of “concretization” when we intend to say
something like “technological evolution.” Moments where once-separate levels of
communicative or informational properties are linked and give way to something
new can be referred to as acts of “disparation,” and so on (Simondon uses the
example of left and right retinal imaging). Third, Simondon allows us to bypass a
longstanding philosophical debate; however, it is one that affects the future of
communication studies also. A Simondonian informational ontology allows us to
finally put aside the subject-object deadlock and instead consider the human that
is present in the technological object, and vice versa, as an ensemble.
Communication research into interfaces and human-computer interaction stand to
benefit from Simondon’s deeply phenomenological approach to technology and
embodied interaction, where the point is less about the separation of the human
from the technical than it is about the successful interoperability of the ensemble.
Fourth, Simondon shifts the discussion from paradigms of closed ecologies to
wide-open informational paradigms. Though this might sound speculative, I
believe Simondon’s informational ontology stands with some of the most rigorous
philosophies of informational structural realism that currently exist, and thus that
it can inform communication not by proffering predetermined boundaries of
inquiry as in ecology, but by recommending an open informational realism that is
amenable to the most radically inquisitive forms of research, such as in
multimodality (Simondon’s concept of “transindividuality” expresses something
of this). But there is much more than this to recommend in Simondon.
For all of the above stated reasons (and many more), Simondon is
uniquely situated to add significantly to communication (and philosophy) once
again. Although tragically cut short, his career and the body of work that it
produced stands as a veritable treasure chest of philosophical diamonds still
waiting to be discovered. In the same way that Ian Hacking found inspiration in
Foucault, producing some of his best work after the French philosopher had died,
or in the way that still countless others found inspiration in Deleuze, when I think
of Simondon it is with the hope that, vicariously, he too will one day enjoy in the
afterlife the career he was so close to obtaining in this one.
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